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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

REASSESSING DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: A NEW OPPORTUNITY

BY

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by

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ABSTRACT

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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States dramatically altered the nation's strategic security environment focusing attention not only on terrorism but also creating opportunities to reexamine other aspects of our security policy. The National Drug Control Strategy is one policy that bears renewed analysis and reassessment, specifically, the U.S. goal of breaking foreign sources of drug supply.

This paper will examine current source zone interdiction and supply reduction goals, the ways and means applied by the U.S. in attempting to achieve success, and an analysis of why current strategy is inadequate.

The paper concludes that the source zone supply reduction and interdiction strategy suffers fatally from ignorance of the market relationship between supply and demand; lack of unity of command and effort, no shared vision; and a failure to synchronize drug control strategy with other national security and economic policies. The author concludes that the problem of illegal drug usage is one that can only be adequately addressed by Americans in America through demand reduction. The drug control strategy should refocus resources on proven successful methods and achievable goals.

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REASSESSING DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: A NEW OPPORTUNITY

The geographic and resource challenges in combating illicit drug importation from the Latin American region into the U.S. are daunting. Here are excerpted facts from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) *Drug Trafficking in the United States* report of Sept 2001.

The illegal drug market is one of the most profitable in the world and attracts sophisticated and aggressive drug traffickers who utilize the numerous entry points and the vast airspace, sea and border regions of the hemisphere to transport their product. Each year, over 60 million people enter the U.S. on more than 675,000 commercial and private flights. An additional 6 million come by sea and 370 million on land. 116 million vehicles cross Mexican and Canadian borders annually. More than 90,000 merchant and passenger ships dock at U.S. ports carrying 9 million shipping containers and 400 million tons of cargo. Additionally, 157,000 smaller vessels visit all along our coasts.

The time and space factors involved in Western Hemisphere drug smuggling are equally daunting. The U.S./Mexico/Canada border is 6,000 miles long. The U.S. coastline is over 12,000 miles long. Colombia alone (foremost source of cocaine and heroin to the U.S.) has a territory of 401,000 sq. miles. For comparison, Afghanistan has an area of 252,000 sq. miles. Texas has an area of 262,000 sq. miles. Vietnam has an area of 125, 621 sq. miles. The Colombian coastline is over 1,800 miles in length. Central America, including Mexico, has over 16,000 miles of coastline. The Caribbean Sea is 1,063,000 sq. miles in area.

Illegal drug usage continues to threaten the health and safety of Americans spreading from urban centers to towns and rural areas bringing with it the scourge of increased violence, criminal activity, wasted lives and missed opportunity. The annual cost to the nation is in the billions of dollars. Despite a national counterdrug effort thathas spanned nearly two decades the problem of U.S. illegal drug use remains generally unabated. The factors contributing to drug use, addiction and successful drug recovery treatment are well studied but have not been successfully addressed by a comprehensive national plan.

This Strategic Research Project is an examination of the failure of U.S. counterdrug strategy in the Latin American source and transit zones, the epicenter for the bulk of illegal cocaine and heroin flow into the United States. Continued pursuit and implementation of source zone strategies to break foreign sources of supply has been largely unsuccessful, is strategically out of balance with the realities of market economics, and does not attack the strategic center of gravity: domestic demand. Although this analysis focuses on the Latin American source zone, the performance measures presented represent data from all foreign source zones. This paper recommends a revision of national drug control policy in order to:

source zones. This paper recommends a revision of national drug control policy in order to: synchronize strategic aim and effort; simplify unity of command; reduce focus and resources from overseas supply reduction and interdiction; and shift the main effort to domestic education, prevention, and treatment.

NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY.

The national security strategy (NSS), *A National Security Strategy For a Global Age*, derives national values from the preamble to the U.S. Constitution and describes those values as national objectives: enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights.² To achieve national objectives, the NSS outlines a strategy of engagement based on three pillars: <u>Shaping</u> the International Environment, <u>Responding</u> to Threats and Crises, and <u>Preparing</u> for an Uncertain Future.³ Under the NSS, drug trafficking, interdiction and supply reduction are noted in the Respond Pillar as one of the "criminal activities that originate overseas...threaten the safety and well being of the American people." ⁴ From this description it may be inferred that drug trafficking is considered a threat that relates to an *important* national interest.

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY AND STRATEGY.

As an implementing strategy under the NSS, the security threat posed by drug trafficking is addressed through the office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and by the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), which integrates prevention and treatment with law enforcement and interdiction efforts. As the integrator of the Federal effort against drugs, the ONDCP's key responsibilities include:

- Develop performance targets and measures for each strategic goal.
- Identify major programs and activities of drug control program agencies that support the goals and objectives of the strategy.
- Monitor consistency between the drug related goals and objectives of the drug control agencies and ensure that their goals and budgets support and are fully consistent with the strategy.
- Coordinate the development and implementation of national drug control data collection and reporting systems to support policy formulation and performance measurement.
- Revise performance targets and measures to conform to drug control program agency budgets.

By law, ONDCP's principle role is to guide the disparate efforts of numerous agencies by setting national drug control priorities and objectives articulated in the NDCS.⁵ Prior to 1999, Congress required the Administration through the ONDCP to issue a NDCS each year. The most recent was submitted in February 1999.⁶ Public Law 105-277 now requires only an annual report on progress made in implementing the strategy.⁷

The strategic aim described by the NSS and the NDCS is to cut illegal drug use and availability in the United States by 50% by 2007, and reduce the health and social consequences of drug use and trafficking by 25% over the same period. The 1996 NDCS established five goals as the basis for a long-term effort. Those goals, nearly six years old, remain the heart of the current drug control strategy. They are:

- Goal 1. Educate and enable America's youth to reject illegal drugs as well as alcohol and tobacco.
- Goal 2. Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drugrelated crime and violence.
- Goal 3.Reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use by reducing the treatment gap.
- Goal 4. Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
- Goal 5. Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.⁸

Goals Four and Five are specifically targeted at drug trafficking, supply reduction and interdiction. All five goals of the NDCS are supported by a total of thirty-one distinct objectives (subsets). For Goals Four and Five they are:

Goal Four: Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

- Conduct flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at its borders.
- Improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S. drug law enforcement programs with particular emphasis on the Southwest Border, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
- Improve bilateral and regional cooperation with Mexico as well as other cocaine and heroin transit zone countries in order to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
- Support and highlight research and technology including the development of scientific information and data to detect, disrupt, deter and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at the U.S. Borders.

Goal Five: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

- Produce a net reduction in the worldwide cultivation of coca, opium, and marijuana and in the production of other illegal drugs, especially methamphetamine.
- Disrupt and dismantle major international trafficking organizations and arrest, prosecute and incarcerate their leaders.
- Support and complement source country drug control efforts and strengthen source country political will and drug control capabilities.
- Develop and support bilateral, regional, and multilateral initiatives and mobilize international organizational efforts against all aspects of illegal drug production, trafficking, and abuse.
- Promote international policies and laws that deter money laundering and facilitate anti-money laundering investigations as well as seizure and forfeiture of associated assets.
- Support and highlight research and technology including the development of scientific information and data – to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States and at U.S. borders.⁹

These objectives, along with an annual classified NDCS annex, guide ONDCP's coordination of more than fifty federal agencies, Cabinet departments, state and local partner agencies and private sector organizations committed to reducing drug abuse and its consequences. ¹⁰ Under ONDCP oversight, these agencies and organizations support drug abuse education and research, prevention, treatment, law enforcement and interdiction activities within the U.S. and internationally.

Goal Four (Shielding air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat) is implemented by the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Treasury, Justice, Transportation, State, and Defense Departments (DOD). These agencies share the tasks of detecting, monitoring, and seizing suspected drug smuggling; intelligence fusion and dissemination; and inspecting inbound and outbound individuals, cargo, and conveyances in order to curtail the flow of drugs through the transit zone (countries and regions through which narcotics transit) and across the U.S. borders.

Goal Five (Reducing the supply of illegal drugs) is targeted at source countries (those countries who grow and produce illegal narcotics) and implemented through: crop substitution and eradication programs; alternative development; strengthening public institutions; coordinated investigations; detection and monitoring; limited intelligence fusion and exchange; interdiction; control of precursors; military and law enforcement training; and bilateral, regional

and global accords.¹¹ The DEA, U.S. Customs, State, Justice, Transportation and Defense Departments cooperate together and with participating source and transit zone nations to conduct and implement the above programs.

RESOURCING THE STRATEGY.

The Federal drug control budget supports the five goals and thirty-one objectives of the NDCS and represents appropriations for more than 50 federal agencies. The budget is structured to support measurable and quantifiable progress toward the targets outlined in the ONDCP Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) system.

For FY 2000 approximately \$18.8 billion was appropriated for federal programs including supplemental funding for Plan Colombia (the Colombian Government's strategy and plan for economic and political stability) and the Andean Region. This represents an increase of 58% over the FY 1992 level of \$11.9 billion. The bulk of the increases occurred between 1996-2000 and represents a significant increase for every major functional category of drug control with the exception of domestic law enforcement. Specifically, appropriations for international and interdiction programs declined between FY 1992 – FY 1996 but increased by 46 percent and 432 percent from FY 1996 to FY 2000. Prevention funding was stable between FY 1992 and FY 1996 but increased by 48 percent between FY 1996 – FY 2000. Treatment funding increased by 18 percent from FY 1992 – FY 1996 and 26 percent between FY 1996 – FY 2000. Domestic law enforcement funding increased by 42 percent between FY 1992 – FY 1996 and only by 22 percent from FY 1996 – FY 2000.

MEASURING PROGRESS

How is progress toward strategic goals and objectives measured? Despite a long-term engagement in a war on drugs, U.S. measures of effectiveness were not codified until recently. In an attempt to bring accountability to the national drug control policy and strategy ONDCP formally instituted Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME) in 1997 (becoming operational in 1998) as a means of informing drug control agencies about progress toward achieving the five strategic goals of the NDCS and supporting objectives. Additionally, the PME system is intended to identify problem areas and promote corrective action where required. The current PME Report documents progress made through 1999.¹³

The PME System is based on twelve Impact Targets that indicate progress toward the five strategic goals over a ten-year period, 1998-2007. The PME Report assesses progress on individual targets as "on track" or "off track" in meeting the prescribed intermediate and

ten year targets. The baseline year for PME data collection and comparison is set at 1996. Three critical areas focus on drug use, availability, and the consequences of drug use; the heart of the drug control mission:

- For overall U.S. illegal drug use, the end state is a 50 percent reduction by 2007 as compared against 1996 levels. An interim target has been established at 25 percent reduction by 2002.
- For overall illegal drug availability, the end state is a fifty percent reduction by 2007 of the available supply of illegal drugs in the U.S. The interim target is a 25 percent reduction by 2002.
- Other targets which fall outside the parameters of this essay but tangentially impact Goals Four and Five include: an end state of 30 percent reduction by 2007 in drug related violent crime and a health and social cost end state reduction of 25 percent by 2007.¹⁴

Although the PME System is ONDCP's official measurement of success (or lack thereof) in attaining impact target and strategic goals, it is not the only measurement. Other U.S. government agencies implementing the strategy, i.e., DEA, track additional key indicators and measurements that are not included in ONDCP's PME Report but are nonetheless valid. These indicators and measurements include: retail and wholesale illegal drug prices (which are a key indicator of availability); eradication rates; source country law enforcement seizure and production statistics; and production efficiencies such as greater alkaloid content from coca paste. To add to the mix, ONDCP annually publishes testimony, reports and statistics outside the PME Report that contradict many of its official 2001 PME statistics.

In the following section both ONDCP and Interagency measurements will be examined in light of Goals Four and Five and analyzed for signs of progress toward achieving objectives. The discrepancies between PME Report results, other ONDCP documents and Interagency measurements and testimony illustrate the difficulties inherent in accurate data collection, common data interpretation, the challenges to unity of command and effort, and lastly, a failure in achieving relevant and significant progress toward stated targets and objectives.

ON TARGET? WHAT THE MEASUREMENTS REPORT

Success in achieving the interdiction and source zone reduction targets for Goals Four and Five would result in progress toward achieving success in overall reduction in illicit drug

availability and potentially, reduced drug usage in the U.S. The 2001 PME Report details the following:

Drug Use. Progress toward reducing overall drug use is off track relative to the base year 1996. Past month usage of any illicit drug rose 14.8%. This indicates that at the current rate of progress, the 2002 and 2007 targets will not be met. Specifics include:

- Use levels of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin have remained relatively constant between 1996 and 1999.
- The average age at which youth first use marijuana, cocaine and heroin has remained essentially constant.
- Unless progress is escalated, the 2002 and 2007 prevention goals will not be met.
- Use of illicit drugs (ages 12 and over) rose from 1996 to 1999.
- Drug use by 18-25 year olds employed part-time rose noticeably after an intermediate decline (8.6% in 1999 vs. 8.6% in 1996).
- The number of chronic users did not decrease sufficiently to be "on track".
- The number of chronic heroin users increased. Chronic cocaine users decreased only marginally.

Availability. Reduction in the quantity of illegal drugs available in the U.S. is "off track" for the second consecutive year. Estimates of the availability of cocaine, heroin and marijuana indicate that progress is "off track" for each drug.

Goals Four and Five. "Progress toward interdicting the amount of cocaine coming through the transit and arrival zones is on track, however, the source zone outflow rate increased in 1999 due to increased production efficiencies although fewer metric tons have been produced since 1996, almost the same proportion of it was moved by traffickers to the source zone departure areas for export." ¹⁵ This means that while interdiction targets are being met, the overall outflow has increased so that drug availability is still up. With respect to marijuana and heroin, the rate is unknown. Accurate flow models for both drugs are unavailable. Progress toward reducing the amount of cocaine exported from source countries is off track. Almost 73% of all cocaine departing the source countries made it into the U.S. As noted above, other agencies such as DEA and the Coast Guard contribute measurement and analysis not in the ONDCP statistics but relevant to assessment of progress:

Prices and Purity. These two indicators are tracked and reported by the DEA. The price and purity of both retail and wholesale drugs is a key indicator of product availability and demand. In 2000, cocaine prices remained low and stable indicating a steady market

supply. Average purity for cocaine at gram, ounce and kilo levels remained high. The availability and purity of heroin, particularly Colombian heroin, has increased dramatically since 1993.¹⁶

Interdiction, Eradication, and Its Effects on Production. Dollars do not equal success. The significant increase in federal funding for international and interdiction programs in support of Goals Four and Five have not produced results that indicate success according to Interagency and international statistics and measurements. The following facts and statistics are a representative sample:

- While interdiction and international program funding increased by 432% and 46% respectively since 1996, source zone cocaine and heroin production increased during the same timeframe.¹⁷ (This is another example of contradiction within ONDCP's own reports. The ONDCP PME Report cited above states that overall production declined but export volume increased).
- "Despite record setting seizure figures for the past two years, the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) drug seizure rate, defined as USCG seizure totals measured as a percentage of total flow, fell in FY 2000 due to dramatically increased flow. While our seizures increased markedly, the flow increased even more. ...Despite a strong effort and extensive interagency and international cooperation, we were unable to meet our 13% seizure rate target in 2000. We therefore face considerable challenges in meeting our 18% and 28% targets in 2002 and 2007 respectively." (This testimony of Admiral Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard given on May 15, 2001 corroborates the increased export volume of South American cocaine.)
- A June 1999 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report indicated that despite two years of extensive herbicide spraying in Colombia, net coca cultivation actually increased by 50 percent.¹⁹ Once again, the ONDCP statistics and data collide with those of another member of the Interagency.
- Colombian police records indicate that in 1995, 62,000 acres of coca was sprayed with herbicide. From January to September 2001 170,000 acres were sprayed. However, over the same period identified coca fields rose from 125,000 to 403,000 acres. 403,000 acres of coca can produce approximately 947,000 kilos of cocaine. But from January through September 2001, Colombian authorities impounded only 14,000 kilos of cocaine, down from 47,000 kilos in 1998.²⁰

The data clearly indicate the questionable efficacy of increased funding for eradication and interdiction. In fact, a counterintuitive result occurs; more money creates larger drug volume.

OTHER MEASUREMENTS.

ONDCP PME and targets do not measure key indicators such as price and purity. For other PME targets, such as heroin flow, there is insufficient data or data collection systems to even measure progress. For other targets and measurements, both Interagency and international, the statistics, measurements and expert assessments vary in degree or are contradictory, but only in this regard: the degree of failure they signal.

Although agencies and experts may disagree as to the nuances of the conclusions drawn from the measurements it is clear that, collectively, the measurements show the U.S. experiencing significant tactical, operational and strategic failure in mission accomplishment regarding Goal Four and particularly Goal Five and their associated intermediate targets (objectives).

WHY WE ARE FAILING.

The U.S. is failing to achieve strategic objectives and targets as the result of a mistaken assessment of the strategic center of gravity in the drug war and a misapplication of the principles of war and related strategic and operational maxims in prosecuting the fight. The principles of war and maxims applicable to the fight against drugs include:

DEMAND: THE HUB OF ALL POWER AND MOVEMENT

Most experts agree and most laymen intuitively understand that the demand for illegal drugs is the strategic center of gravity in the drug war, yet only one of the five national strategic goals addresses demand reduction directly. The remainder of the effort is diffused with flank attacks, particularly source zone reduction, interdiction and eradication. Simply put, the demand is enormous and profits are enormous; consequently, a market relationship exists between eager consumers and willing, flexible, and resourceful producers who have consistently demonstrated their adaptability to interdiction strategies.

Myles Frechette, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia from 1994 to 1997 wrote in Feb 2000:

"Squeeze the narcos hard in Colombia and they will slip away to operate elsewhere. Yet, it is not enough to reduce the drug supply or to interdict it in transit. The United States also must reduce consumption further. ... We have tried to stop narcotrafficking from Colombia since the mid-1970s. ... The high prices Americans are willing to pay for these illicit substances generate sufficient profits for Colombian narcotraffickers to pay for constant innovation in producing and smuggling these substances into the United States. Each new strategy adopted by U.S. law enforcement agencies and their Colombian counterparts has resulted in new criminal counterstrategies.

"Colombia can produce three crops of opium poppy a year and, despite ever improving crop eradication efforts, new acreage planted with coca continues to increase. In the early 1990s the Colombians, with U.S. help, won big victories against the Medellin Cartel only to see the Cali Cartel pump even more drugs into the United States. In 1995 the Colombians put all the Cali Cartel kingpins in jail. But low-level remnants of both organizations continue to move drugs into the United States. Last fall...one Mexican and thirty Colombian narcotraffickers were arrested at the request of the United States. ...We also know that less well-known criminals will take the places of those arrested, drawn by the profits to be made in this country." ²¹

An analysis of ONDCP data indicates that minor downward fluctuations in drug usage are matched by downward trends in production and drugs available for U.S. consumption, thus indicating a direct market relationship not necessarily affected by interdiction efforts. ²² One of the major problems with supply reduction efforts (source control, interdiction) is that suppliers simply produce for the market what they would have produced anyway, plus enough extra to cover anticipated government seizures. ²³ Attacking source zone cartels, such as the Medellin and Cali cartels which controlled Colombian cocaine production and export in the last two decades, proved to be only a short-term victory. The market rapidly responded with decentralized production and export controlled by a multitude of smaller organizations. Additionally, during the past decade, through experimentation, production organizations have increased the potency and volume from the same amount of raw leaf. ²⁴ Interdiction efforts intercept 10-15% of the heroin and 30% of the cocaine. Drug traffickers earn gross profit margins of up to 300%. At least 75% of international drug shipments would need to be intercepted to substantially reduce the profitability of drug trafficking

SIMPLICITY

As a principle of war, simplicity is considered the ability to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. The current unclassified National Drug Control Strategy is neither simple nor concise. At one hundred ninety-one pages, it is nearly three times the volume of the entire unclassified National Security Strategy of which it is a supporting document. The Performance Measures of Effectiveness Report weighs in at two hundred sixty-six pages containing five goals, thirty-one objectives and one hundred fifty-six PME targets. The sheer number and size of federal, state, and local agencies involved in designing and implementing the NDCS causes the preparation of clear, uncomplicated strategy and plans to be extremely challenging. When coupled with the necessity to coordinate and synchronize international strategies and operations, the task becomes even more fragmented.

UNITY OF COMMAND & UNITY OF EFFORT

Strategic, operational and tactical synergy is created by the integration and effective command and control of disparate efforts. Fragmentation and overlap of missions, budgets and programs of the more than 50 federal agencies involved has long been a recognized stumbling block in effective unity of effort and command in the drug fight. ONDCP was created to provide the coordination, integration, and oversight of these federal and Cabinet agencies as well as their state and local partners.²⁵ ONDCP attempts to fulfill that difficult mandate through policy and strategy guidance but has no operational control over the agencies involved.

However, ONDCP's key responsibilities outlined above include no coordinating ability in terms of a hierarchical command structure to which the disparate agencies must respond. Operations and tactical planning are conducted and executed by a vast array of U.S. and Participating Nation agencies with little national level coordination and oversight to synchronize activity toward strategic goals. Campaign planning, encompassing all the players in the region, does not exist. Consequently, the 2001 PME Report credits success in identifying all existing U.S. interagency drug control relationships but failure in assessing those relationships and developing a strategy to address identified gaps and to establish secure interoperative communications capabilities. The PME Report further states that progress toward ensuring that each major source country adopts a drug control strategy is determined to be unknown. Identifying the "players" is clearly not enough to achieve meaningful success when those same "players" have significant gaps in strategic and operational relationships, including the inability to effectively communicate. When source

zone participating nations have not developed complementary drug control strategies, and when U.S. agencies operate from no common campaign plan the negative implications for unity of effort are significant. The chance of success is marginal.

The lack of unity of command from the top reveals itself most noticeably at the operational and tactical level in interdiction efforts on U.S. borders and in the source and transit zones. The plethora of U.S. agencies involved in the effort each interpret strategic guidance differently and exercise operational control over their own organizations, often resulting in a lack of synergy and duplication. "...The witnesses (Director of ONDCP, DEA, JTF-6, INS, US Customs) could not agree on a plan to increase the seizure of illegal narcotics at the border, although several testified that a coordinator of federal agencies ...would curtail drug trafficking."²⁶

As the Director of Operations for Joint Interagency Task Force- South (JIATF-S) from 1997-1999, the author witnessed firsthand this lack of unity of command and effort that had frequent and significant negative impact on mission accomplishment. All Armed Services contributed personnel and assets to the task force, as did U.S. Customs Service and DEA. However, tactical and operational command relationships were never firmly established in writing or enforceable. Each agency answered operationally to its own hierarchy. The result was, in effect, a "coalition of the willing" with any participating agency able to reject mission taskings for any reason they deemed valid. As a result, significant opportunities to interdict narco-trafficking flights in the source zone were frequently lost when a participating agency elected not to fulfill mission requirements.

While unity of effort was difficult enough within the JIATF, it was often compounded by disagreement with external U.S. interdiction agencies sharing Latin American responsibilities as to use of assets, targeting, rules of engagement and even geographic areas of responsibility. This problem was highlighted by the April 2000 accidental shootdown of a missionary plane in Peru by the Peruvian Air Force working in conjunction with CIA tracking aircraft. After investigating the incident the Senate Intelligence Committee recommended the Bush Administration not resume the assistance to shootdowns until procedures are radically improved. The committee cited an antiquated air traffic control system, a cumbersome communications system and chain of command for conducting interceptions. Additionally, the CIA was cited as having failed in its oversight responsibilities and improperly managed the program.²⁷ The lack of operational oversight and command and control of the CIA tracker program in Peru by a coordinating agency (e.g. JIATF-S) was identified to U.S. Southern Command, the Peru Country Team and the U.S. Interdiction

Coordinator as a potentially serious problem as early as 1997 by JIATF-S. Those efforts met with no resolution until the tragic, but not unforeseen, missionary shootdown occurred in 2001.

Unity of effort and command at the JIATF were also made challenging by regional dynamics and were indicative of a major challenge to coalition operations, namely, intelligence sharing. The source and transit zone nations represented by liaison officers were not cleared for U.S. intelligence sharing, had a limited ability to influence the operations of their national interdiction and law enforcement agencies and, as previously noted, were frequently operating with no national strategy of their own. This inability to readily share information resulted in delayed or missed tactical opportunities and mutual frustration between the U.S. and participating nations. New intelligence sharing guidelines were introduced in March 1999 that did expedite some limited sharing and exchange, but the difficulty has not been completely resolved.²⁸

Despite the above challenges, the detection, monitoring and interdiction operations did achieve some notable tactical and limited operational successes. Those successes were achieved in spite of the lack of a clear, nationally mandated, enforceable command and control structure and campaign plan and were transitory in terms of strategic impact on Goals Four and Five of the NDCS. Clearly, the challenges presented in achieving unity of command and effort in pursuit of consistent success vis a vis Goals Four and Five has eluded the U.S. When the dynamics of multinational strategy coordination and operational synchronization are added, the challenge becomes overwhelming.

As if this weren't enough, unity of effort is also seriously undermined by the vast amounts of money involved in all aspects of the drug trade and the resultant potential for corruption on the part of law enforcement and military officials from both the U.S. and participating nations. In their June 1999 report "Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow" the GAO cited widespread corruption within all sectors of the Colombian government, the prison system and the military that affects counternarcotics operations.²⁹ Three examples are indicative of the problem:

In 1998, a U.S. air interdiction platform tracking a suspect narcotrafficking aircraft intercepted a radio transmission between source zone participating nation military air traffic controllers and the narcotrafficker giving precise details as to U.S. surveillance schedules and routes. The narcotrafficker was able to successfully avoid interception by participating nation military aircraft, which were under the control of the same air traffic personnel. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated incident. Host nation riders (participating nation

military and law enforcement officials riding on U.S. detection and monitoring platforms) have long been suspected of ongoing collaboration with drug traffickers, revealing routes and schedules of U.S. assets and collection activities.³⁰

This distrust of participating nation officials extends not only to strategic planning and tactical operations but also to intelligence sharing. In November 1998, thirteen pounds of heroin and 1,639 pounds of cocaine were found by U.S. Customs officials onboard a Colombian Air Force C-130 arriving at Fort Lauderdale, Fla. The plane made regular trips to Florida for logistics support reasons. U.S. Customs officials had apparently been informed that drugs were aboard the aircraft but did not share that intelligence with Colombian authorities. The incident embarrassed the Colombian government, discredited Colombian Air Force credibility and resulted in a major shake-up of its command structure including the resignation of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Colombian President Andres Pastrana was incensed that the intelligence had not been shared with the Colombians prior to the plane departing Colombia. "Why, if they knew about this cargo...didn't they tell us first?" ³¹

U.S. personnel involved in the anti-drug fight have also been affected by the lure of narcotics money. Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay, Robert White told Salon Magazine, "There's always been a fear of this by sensible people in the Pentagon. The legend is that the United States military is incorruptible, but that has proven not to be the case. There are quite a few instances of this corruption."

In July 2000, Col. James Hiett, the Military Group Commander in Bogotá was convicted for money laundering activities in connection with an attempt to conceal his wife's drug smuggling from the U.S. embassy in Bogotá. Hiett had been the key link in both the embassy and U.S. Southern Command's military anti-drug efforts in Colombia.³³ The scandal exacerbated the mutual trust problems between U.S. and Colombian authorities and with the resultant diminution to unity of effort.

RESOURCING

As previously noted, budgetary resourcing in support of Goals Four and Five is at an all time high. The same cannot be said for manpower and equipment resources supporting the strategy. The impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant war on terror have had a profound effect on the physical implementation of the interdiction strategy.

Prior to the events of September 11, DoD and Interagency manpower and assets were already thinly spread over a vast operational area and were not achieving appreciable levels of success in detection, monitoring, interdiction and eradication. The U.S. focus on terrorism

has dramatically shifted assets and personnel away from what was, at best, an economy of force operation. DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs, Coast Guard and the Air Force have shifted personnel and platforms to the terror war. Aircraft and ships dedicated to counternarcotics missions have fallen 65 and 75 percent since September 11. Intelligence collection in Colombia has fallen in priority with collection assets redirected elsewhere.³⁴

OBJECTIVE

Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02) defines *objective* as, "The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which every ...operation should be directed". ³⁵ Although an argument can be made that the goals and objectives (Four and Five) of the NDCS are indeed decisive and clearly defined, the argument for attainability is much more difficult to make based on the performance measurements and analysis presented above. If an objective cannot be attacked effectively, it should be reconsidered. The geographic and demographic dimensions of detection, monitoring, interdiction and eradication are huge and would require both a huge monetary and force commitment that this country has been unwilling to provide and may not be capable of mustering due to the costs involved in operations on such a vast scale. Even if extensive resources were feasible and were available, problems with synergy, unity of effort and unity of command would remain formidable and likely become more unwieldy with a larger national and international effort. Lastly, an objective is of little value unless its attainment contributes to undermining the enemy center of gravity: the demand for illegal narcotics and the market relationship established between demand and supply.

ALTERNATIVES

The strategic aim, goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy have long been a subject of endless public debate with the dialog focused on two poles: the supply reductionists vs. the demand reductionists. This essay has attempted to demonstrate that supply reduction strategies do not effectively attack the strategic center of gravity or key vulnerabilities of the illegal narcotics flow, availability, or use in the United States. The money generated by narcotrafficking combined with rampant corruption, vast operational areas, demographic challenges, paucity of manpower and equipment resources, and ineffective command and control all combine to facilitate the market relationship between eager customers and willing, resourceful suppliers.

So what is to be done? The following courses of action are presented as representative of the most common presentations by credible authorities and subject matter experts:

CONTINUE CURRENT STRATEGY

This course of action is in balance with the Respond element of the current NSS. The continuation of current strategy and implementation is a key factor in current State Deptment and Commander-in-Chief (CINC) theater engagement strategies, including Plan Colombia. Significant assets and political capital are invested in the current approach. Supporters of this course of action may contend that current measures of success are less than a decade old and therefore inconclusive, that more time and increased funding are necessary in order to produce conclusive results.

The case against this course of action has been laid out in this essay. Goals Four and Five will likely not be achievable when current levels of funding, forces available, command and control architecture, and the flexibility and resourceful nature of the market address future demand. A cost vs. benefit analysis would indicate that exponential increases in funding and (until September, 2001) force structure have produced negligible results. In other words, the ways may not be effective and resources (means) are not sufficient to achieve the ends. Based on the above analysis the strategic objective of 50% reduction in illegal drug availability by 2007 will not be met by this option.

LEGALIZATION

This course of action would eliminate Goals Four and Five, decriminalize drug use, including marijuana, and focus resources on treatment and education alone.³⁶ Proponents claim that it will reduce prison population; shift law enforcement resources to other priority issues and eliminate national resources allocated to interdiction and supply reduction. Drug addiction treatment would become a top priority in a strategy based on legalization.

Legalization is unsupported by national popular consensus and at odds with popularly perceived national values and morality. A strategy based on legalization would stand little chance of broad-based popular acceptance and support and governmental advocates of this strategy would likely face significant political risk. Additionally, there is little documented corroboration that overall drug use will be reduced. Therefore, this option does little to effectively achieve the strategic goal of 50% illegal drug reduction by 2007.

Continuing current policy and strategy has demonstrated itself to be a dead-end road.

Despite massive increases in funding and Interagency participation, measurable progress

toward source zone reduction and meaningful interdiction has eluded the United States.

Legalization is politically unpopular and does little to address demand reduction, the heart of the problem

A NEW DEMAND-SIDE STRATEGY

September 11, 2001 not only altered the ways in which Americans view national security priorities but may provide the Administration with a new window of opportunity to assess the failures of current policy and formulate a revised national drug control strategy which maintains key elements of current success, discards unattainable and unrealistic objectives and is fully synchronized with both homeland security priorities and a new National Security Strategy.

As long as a demand for illegal drugs exists a supplier will be available and the strategic goal will be out of balance with the reality of market dynamics. To achieve meaningful results over time the following recommendations are submitted:

- a. Promulgate a new strategic vision that clearly identifies the demand for illegal drugs as a clear and present threat to national security caused, not by other nations or drug traffickers, but by our nation's appetite and monetary support for illegal narcotics. This revised strategic vision recognizes that the United States has been reinforcing failure in pursuit of source zone interdiction, supply reduction and eradication. Shift the strategic and operational main effort to demand reduction, to include increased budgetary support to education, prevention and treatment. Successful treatment programs are not cheap (approximately twenty thousand dollars per year), however, successful treatment programs do exist, are in need of expansion, and are cheaper than the annual thirty to sixty thousand dollars required to incarcerate a prisoner in state or federal prison.³⁷
- b. Address national drug control policy under both Shape and Respond elements of the current NSS or under the Assure, Dissuade, Defeat pillars of a new NSS construct. Current strategic reliance on Respond alone fails to address and plan for long term objectives and does little to put the nation in an advantageous position for long term success. The United States has been consistently vulnerable to international critics who argue that the U.S. has been unwilling to take the steps required to lay the ax to the root of narcotrafficking; domestic demand. A new NDCS that focuses the main effort on demand reduction would

would fit well under the Assure, Dissuade and Defeat pillars of a new NSS. Not only would the international community be assured that the U.S. was addressing the root of the problem, such a policy would provide significant U.S. moral leverage in the international community for domestic supply reduction and eradication efforts abroad.

- c. Eliminate Goal Five. Focus strategic goals and objectives and shift resources to ways that have already effectively demonstrated progress in achieving the strategic goal, e.g. demand reduction (shaping/deter, dissuade), treatment (respond/defeat), and education (shaping/deter, dissuade). Rather than attempts to end external drug supply, strategic goals should focus on actions in America, by Americans that will defeat the threat to national security of drug use and trafficking. American soil is the arena for decisive action. Although this recommendation would eliminate source zone activities such as detection, monitoring, tracking and eradication, it is not advocacy for a complete cessation of useful and productive U.S. law enforcement involvement in activities such as anti-money laundering and intelligence collection in source and transit zones.
- d. Retain and Modify Goal Four. Current efforts at tightening border crossing control as a result of terrorism have produced a measurable decrease in illicit drugs crossing U.S. borders.³⁸ Streamlined interagency operational command and control would complement controlling the border crossings from both terrorist and drug flow. Although Goal Four should be retained, it should be thoroughly reevaluated and synchronized with the NSS. Interdiction efforts should perhaps be concentrated nearer to our borders and coastlines than is presently the case.
- e. Place ONDCP and its functions under the strategic and operational oversight of the Homeland Security Office. This action would: provide much needed unity of effort; clearly identify illegal drugs as a threat to national security; highlight the connections between drug trafficking and funding of terrorism; allow for a streamlined command and control of enforcement; and facilitate a comprehensive and coordinated assessment of drug control and its interrelationship (balance) with other national policies such as NAFTA.
- f. The most critical element to success in implementing a new NDCS that shifts focus to demand reduction is the role of leadership. The support of the American people is the essential element of success in implementation. For the last decade the support of the American people in the drug war has not been effectively

sought or rallied. For many Americans, the most memorable statement on the subject of drugs by former President Clinton was, "I didn't inhale." Presidential leadership and moral authority is imperative in the elucidation of the new strategic vision. Only the President can effectively engage the public in describing the threat to national security; provide recognition that past strategic goals, ways and means have been partially ineffective; and rally Americans to engage in a long-term strategy that focuses on attainable objectives and responsibility at home and actions that each American can take in attainment of those objectives. The current war on terror provides the Administration an opportunity to effect this fundamental change in strategy while Presidential influence is at its height with the American people. Illegal drug use should be described as un-American, hurting nor only the user but the community and country and contributing to funding terrorist activities against the United States. A unique window in time has opened in which the U.S. has the opportunity to stop reinforcing strategic failure and begin to reevaluate policy, develop and synchronize strategy and more effectively attack the root, the center of gravity, of the illegal drug threat: demand.

RECOMMENDATION.

The U.S. should adopt a drug policy and strategy in consonance with the third alternative described above. The record is clear regarding the lack of success in U.S. interdiction and reduction efforts in the source and transit zones. The record is similarly clear that illegal drug supply is directly related to demand and that demand is the center of gravity and should be the focus of main effort in our national strategy.

CONCLUSION.

For the past decade American drug strategy has mirrored Frederick the Great's maxim, "He who defends everything defends nothing." U.S. drug policy and strategy has, in effect, "shotgunned" its efforts across a wide array of goals and objectives and ways and means with marginal results. A strategic reassessment and modified strategy is needed that clearly addresses demand as the focus of strategic effort, is led by the President, and is implemented with greater unity of command and effort.

As this paper was being completed the Bush Administration published the 2002 National Drug Control Strategy. The strategy appears to parallel many of the observations and

recommendations set forth in this paper. Demand is addressed as the root cause of our nation's drug problem. National strategic priorities are set forth in the following order: stopping use before it starts; healing America's drug users; disrupting the market – attacking the economic basis of the drug trade. In his introduction to the new NDCS, President Bush calls for returning the fight against drugs to "the center of our national agenda" and, " As a Nation, we know how to teach character and how to dissuade children from ever using illegal drugs. We need to act on that knowledge." ³⁹ These are encouraging indicators that the strategic center of gravity for drug policy and strategy has been correctly identified and that goals, ways and means will be prioritized, synchronized and balanced to a greater degree than in the past.

Word Count: 7,474

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